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Abstract
Blind quantum computing protocols enable a client, who can generate or measure single-qubit
states, to delegate quantum computing to a remote quantum server protecting the client’s privacy
(i.e., input, output, and program). With current technologies, generations or measurements of
single-qubit states are not too much burden for the client. In other words, secure delegated quantum
computing is possible for “almost classical” clients. However, is it possible for a “completely
classical” client? Here we consider a one-round perfectly-secure delegated quantum computing, and
show that the protocol cannot satisfy both the correctness (i.e., the correct result is obtained when
the server is honest) and the perfect blindness (i.e., the client’s privacy is completely protected)
simultaneously unless BQP is in NP. Since BQP is not believed to be in NP, the result suggests
the impossibility of the one-round perfectly-secure delegated quantum computing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Alice who does not have any sophisticated quantum technology wants to
factorize a large integer. She has a rich friend, Bob, who owns a full-fledged scalable quantum
computer. Alice wants Bob to do the factoring for her. However, the problem is that Alice
does not trust Bob, and therefore she does not want to reveal her input, output, and the
program (in this case Shor’s factoring algorithm) to Bob. Can she delegate her quantum
computation to Bob while protecting her privacy?
Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [1] theoretically showed that such a secure delegated
quantum computing is indeed possible if some minimum quantum technology is assumed
for the client. In the protocol of Ref. [1] (Fig. 1), Alice, a client, has a device that emits
randomly rotated single qubit states. She sends these states to Bob, the server, who has the
full quantum technology. Alice and Bob are also connected with a two-way classical channel.
Bob performs quantum computing by using qubits sent from Alice and classical messages
exchanging with Alice via the classical channel. After finishing his quantum computation,
Bob sends the output of his computation, which is a classical message, to Alice. This message
encrypts the result of Alice’s quantum computing, which is not accessible to Bob. Alice
decrypts the message, and obtains the desired result of her quantum computing. (Ref. [1]
also proposed a quantum input and quantum output protocol.) It was shown in Ref. [1]
that whatever Bob does, he cannot learn anything about the input, the program, and the
output of Alice’s computation (except for some unavoidable leakage, such as upperbounds of
the sizes of the input, output, and program, etc.). Proof-of-principle experiments were also
done with photonic qubits [2–4]. The composable security of the protocol was also shown
in Ref. [5].
In the protocol, the client has to possess a device that generates single qubit states.
Generations of single qubit states are ubiquitous in today’s laboratories, and therefore not
too much burden for the client. In other words, “almost classical” client can enjoy secure
delegated quantum computing.
However, isn’t it possible to realize secure delegated quantum computing for a “completely
classical” client (Fig. 2)? Motivated by this question (and by other important questions
such as the verifiability [6]), many variant protocols for blind quantum computing have
been proposed [6–17, 28]. For example, it was shown that, instead of single-qubit states,
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FIG. 1: The blind quantum computing protocol proposed in Ref. [1]. Alice possesses a device
that emits randomly-rotated single-qubit states. Bob has a universal quantum computer. Alice
and Bob share a two-way classical channel.
the client has only to generate weak coherent pulse states if we add more burden to the
server [7]. Coherent states are considered as “more classical” than single-photon states, and
therefore it enables secure delegated quantum computing for “more classical” client. It was
also shown that secure delegated quantum computing is possible for a client who can only
measure states [8, 9] (Fig. 3). A measurement of a bulk state with a threshold detector is
sometimes much easier than the single-photon generation, and therefore the protocol also
enables “more classical” client. However, these protocols still require the client to have
some minimum quantum technologies, namely the generation of weak coherent pulses or
measurements of quantum states. In fact, all protocols proposed so far require the client to
have some minimum quantum abilities, such as generations or measurements of quantum
states. (If we have two quantum servers, a completely classical client can delegate quantum
computing [1], but in this case, we have to assume that two servers cannot communicate
with each other.)
In short, the possibility of a perfectly-secure delegated quantum computing for a
completely-classical client is open. (Note that the perfect security means that an encrypted
text gives no information about the plain text [18]. It is a typical security notion in the
information theoretical security.)
In this paper, we consider one-round perfectly-secure delegated quantum computing for a
completely-classical client. We show that unless BQP ⊆ NP it is impossible to satisfy both
the correctness and the blindness simultaneously (Theorem 1 below). The definitions of
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FIG. 2: The secure delegated quantum computing for a classical client. Alice has only a classical
computer, whereas Bob has a universal quantum computer. Alice and Bob share a two-way classical
channel.
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FIG. 3: The blind quantum computing protocol proposed in Refs. [8, 9]. Alice possesses a device
that measure qubits. Bob has the ability of generating and storing entangled many-qubit states.
the correctness and blindness are given in Definition 1 and Definition 2 below, respectively.
The containment of BQP in NP is not believed to happen [25, 26], and therefore the result
suggests the impossibility of one-round perfectly-secure delegated quantum computing for a
completely-classical client.
II. SETUP
We first explain one-round perfectly-secure delegated quantum computing for a
completely-classical client. Alice is completely classical, i.e., she has only a probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machine. Alice wants to solve a BQP problem. In other words,
she wants to decide whether x ∈ L or x /∈ L for an instance x of a language L in BQP.
However, Alice cannot do it by herself (unless BQP = BPP), and therefore she delegates
the computation to Bob as follows.
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1. Alice generates a private key k ∈ K, where K is the set of valid keys. The key gen-
eration operation can be done in classical polynomial time. We assume that checking
the validness of a key can be done in classical polynomial time. (Or, we assume that
all bit strings are valid keys.) She then encrypts L and x as Ek(L, x), where E is
the encryption operation, which is deterministic and in classical polynomial time. She
sends Ek(L, x) to Bob.
2. Bob sends Alice 0 with probability pBob(0|Ek(L, x)) and 1 with probability
pBob(1|Ek(L, x)) = 1− pBob(0|Ek(L, x)).
3. Alice calculates the decrypting bit dk(L, x) ∈ {0, 1}, which can be calculated deter-
ministically and in classical polynomial time. (It can be computed before she receives
a bit from Bob.) She accepts if and only if
dk(L, x)⊕ (the bit sent from Bob) = 1.
When dk(L, x) = 0, Bob has to send 1 to make Alice accept. On the other hand, if
dk(L, x) = 1, Bob has to send 0 to make Alice accept. In other words, Bob’s bit has to
be equal to dk(L, x) ⊕ 1 to make Alice accept. Therefore, for fixed L, x, and k, Alice’s
acceptance probability pAlice(acc|L, x, k) is
pAlice(acc|L, x, k) = pBob(dk(L, x)⊕ 1|Ek(L, x)).
We define the correctness and blindness as follows.
Definition 1 [Correctness] We say that a protocol is correct if the following is satisfied.
For any language L ∈ BQP, instance x, and private key k ∈ K, if x ∈ L then
pAlice(acc|L, x, k) ≥ c,
while if x /∈ L then
pAlice(acc|L, x, k) ≤ s,
where c > 1
2
, 0 ≤ s < c ≤ 1, and c− s ≥ 1/poly(|x|).
Definition 2 [Blindness] Informally, blindness means that Bob cannot learn anything about
Alice’s (L, x) from Ek(L, x). More formaly, we say that an encryption is blind if the following
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is satisfied. For any L1, L2 ∈ BQP, valid key k1, x1 ∈ L1, and x2 ∈ L2, there exists a valid
key k2 such that
Ek1(L1, x1) = Ek2(L2, x2).
Note that the above delegation protocol is not the most general one. First, the encryption
operation by Alice is deterministic and symmetric. It is open whether we can consider more
generalized encryptions. Second, Bob sends only a single bit of message to Alice. (Regarding
this point, see the Discussion section.) Finally, Alice’s decryption operation is not the most
general one.
III. RESULT
Now we show our main result:
Theorem 1 If the above protocol satisfies both the correctness and blindness simultane-
ously, then BQP ⊆ NP.
Proof.— Let L be a language in BQP. We show that the following NP protocol can verify
L.
1. Merlin sends polynomial-length classical bit strings w and w0 to Arthur. If Merlin is
honest, w0 is any private key from K, and w is a key from K that satisfies
Ew0(L0, 0) = Ew(L, x), (1)
where
L0 ≡ {x ∈ {0, 1}
∗ | the first bit of x is 0}.
Obviously, 0 ∈ L0 and L0 ∈ BQP. Note that such w always exists for any w0,
since otherwise Bob can learn that Alice’s computation is not (L, x) when he receives
Ew0(L0, 0), which contradicts the blindness.
2. Arthur checks whether w and w0 are valid keys. (We have assumed that the check can
be done in classical polynomial time, or all bit strings are valid keys.) If at least one
of them is invalid, Arthur rejects and aborts.
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3. Arthur calculates Ew(L, x) and Ew0(L0, 0), which can be done deterministically and
in classical polynomial time. Arthur rejects and aborts if
Ew(L, x) 6= Ew0(L0, 0).
4. Arthur calculates dw(L, x) and dw0(L0, 0), which can be done deterministically and in
classical polynomial time. Arthur accepts if and only if
dw(L, x) = dw0(L0, 0).
We show that this NP protocol can verify L. Note that due to the correctness,
pBob(dk(L0, 0)⊕ 1|Ek(L0, 0)) ≥ c (2)
for any key k ∈ K.
First let us consider the case of x ∈ L. In this case, due to the correctness,
pBob(dk(L, x)⊕ 1|Ek(L, x)) ≥ c (3)
for any key k ∈ K. Furthermore, Arthur never rejects at steps 2 and 3. Finally, we can
show dw(L, x) = dw0(L0, 0) and therefore Arthur accepts. In fact, if dw(L, x) 6= dw0(L0, 0),
which means
dw0(L0, 0) = dw(L, x)⊕ 1, (4)
then
c ≤ pBob(dw0(L0, 0)⊕ 1|Ew0(L0, 0)) (from Eq. (2))
= pBob(dw0(L0, 0)⊕ 1|Ew(L, x)) (from Eq. (1))
= pBob(dw(L, x)|Ew(L, x)) (from Eq. (4))
= 1− pBob(dw(L, x)⊕ 1|Ew(L, x))
≤ 1− c (from Eq. (3)),
which contradicts to c > 1
2
. Therefore, Arthur accepts when x ∈ L.
Next let us consider the case of x /∈ L. In this case, due to the correctness,
pBob(dk(L, x)⊕ 1|Ek(L, x)) ≤ s (5)
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for any key k ∈ K. If Arthur arrives at step 4, w and w0 are valid keys, and
Ew(L, x) = Ew0(L0, 0) (6)
is satisfied. Let us assume that
dw(L, x) = dw0(L0, 0). (7)
Then,
c ≤ pBob(dw0(L0, 0)⊕ 1|Ew0(L0, 0)) (from Eq. (2))
= pBob(dw0(L0, 0)⊕ 1|Ew(L, x)) (from Eq. (6))
= pBob(dw(L, x)⊕ 1|Ew(L, x)) (from Eq. (7))
≤ s (from Eq. (5)),
which contradicts to s < c. Therefore, dw(L, x) 6= dw0(L0, 0), which means that Arthur
rejects. In summary, we have shown that L is in NP.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have shown that unless BQP ⊆ NP one-round perfectly-secure del-
egated quantum computing cannot satisfy both the correctness and the perfect blindness
simultaneously.
If we relax the requirement of the perfect security to a computational one, for example,
there would be several ways of secure delegated quantum computing for a classical client [19–
22]. For example, the fully-homomorphic encryption scheme [19] might be able to achieve
secure delegated quantum computing for a classical client. Recently, a secure delegated
quantum computing protocol for a completely classical client has been proposed by using
the Learning With Errors problem [20].
In our proof, we do not assume c− s ≥ 1/poly. Therefore, a similar proof shows that if
PP can be solved in the protocol, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
Finally, we point out that a related result was obtained in Ref. [23], where an impossibility
result of an information-theoretically-secure quantum homomorphic encryption was derived
by showing that the size of the sending message from Alice to Bob must be exponentially
large to hide polynomial-size quantum circuits. We also mention that after uploading the
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first version of this paper on arXiv, more general results on the impossibilities of secure
delegated quantum computing with a completely classical client have been obtained [24].
In particular, Ref. [24] considers more general case where polynomial-length messages are
exchanged in polynomial-round between the server and the client, while the present paper
considers the limited case where only a single bit is sent from the server to the client. On the
other hand, the complexity conjecture, BQP 6⊆ NP, that our result is based on has an oracle
separation [25, 26], while that of Ref. [24], BQP 6⊆ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly, does not [24]. It
is not clear how to generalize our result to the more general case where the server sends a
polynomial-length bit string without introducing advice.
We also mention that Refs. [24, 27] consider delegations of sampling of output probability
distributions of sub-universal quantum computing models, while here we consider delegations
of decision problems in BQP, which does not seem to be directly applied to the sampling.
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